Child Support Legal Question in Pennsylvania?

My daughter has reached the age of 18 and is choosing to go live beside her dad (who also lives in PA), she does not want to go to college until next spill out when she is 19. He has only chosen to terminate child support to me for her but have tried to establish "custodialship". I would like to know if he could do that, and require me to pay child support to him while she is in college or because she chose to walk live with him, is she considered emancipated? I raised her and put up with his shinanagans (ie..denying paternity, never visit, etc.) I think he really only came wager on into her life (which she is so gullible, snowed) so he can "get back what's mine." ie his $$ He have a long history of non payment and has arrears etc. I know other states have college law but for some reason PA has arguable cases against paying while emancipated or in college.
Pennsylvania - No authority to award college support. Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265 (1995)

hope this help, good luck

10/11/95 BONITA KLINE CURTIS v. PHILIP H. KLINE

BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1995.PA.1585 (http://www.versuslaw.com)

[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]

[1] [J-148A-1995]

[2] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

[3] EASTERN DISTRICT

[4] BONITA KLINE CURTIS

v.

[5] PHILIP H. KLINE

[6] APPEAL OF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE

[7] No. 6 Eastern District Appeal Docket 1994

[8] Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Domestic Relations Section, Entered January 12, 1994 at No. 1012 N. 1984, Granting Defendant's Petition to Modify and Terminate Support

[9] ARGUED September 21, 1995

[10] DECIDED: October 10, 1995

[11] OPINION

[12] JUSTICE ZAPPALA

[13] In Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992), we declined to see a duty requiring a parent to provide college educational support because no such legal duty had be imposed by the General Assembly or developed by our case law. As a result of our Blue decision, the legislature promulgated Act 62 of 1993. Section 3 of the Act states:

[14] (a) General rule. -- . . . a court may writ either or both parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation to provide equitably for educational costs of their child whether an application for this support is made up to that time or after the child has reached 18 years of age.

[15] 23 Pa.C.S. Section(s) 4327(a).

[16] The issue now back us is whether the Act violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.*fn1 The Court of Common Pleas of Chester County held that it did, resulting in this direct appeal.*fn2

[17] The relevant facts are not in dispute. Appellee is the father of Jason, Amber and Rebecca. On July 12, 1991, an instruct of court for support was entered on behalf of Appellee's children. On March 2, 1993, Appellee filed a petition to cancel his support obligation as to Amber, a student at Kutztown University, and Jason, a student at West Chester University. After Act 62 was promulgated, Appellee was granted walk off to include a constitutional challenge to the Act as a basis for seeking relief from post-secondary tutorial support.

[18] In accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 235, the Attorney General was notified of the constitutional rebel to Act 62, but declined to participate in the litigation. On January 11, 1994, the trial court granted Appellee's petition to end support for Amber and Jason, concluding that Act 62 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. After Appellee's petition to modify his post-secondary education support obligation was disposed of, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) sought and be granted leave to intervene. DPW then filed a make out of appeal to this Court.

[19] The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in pertinent part provides:

[20] No State shall . . . deprive any person of vivacity, liberty, or

[21] property, without due process of law; nor deny to any party

[22] within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

[23] The essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection under the canon is that like persons in close to circumstances will be treated similarly. Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981). However, it does not require that all persons under adjectives circumstances enjoy identical protection under the tenet. James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984). The right to equal protection under the law does not absolutely prohibit the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purpose of unloading different treatment, Robson v. Penn Hills School District, 63 Pa. Cmwlth. 250, 437 A.2d 1273 (1981), and does not require equal treatment of people having different needs. Houtz v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare, 42 Pa. Cmwlth. 406, 401 A.2d 388 (1979). The prohibition against treating ancestors differently under the law does not preclude the Commonwealth from resorting to legislative classifications, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237 (1922), provided that those classifications are reasonable to some extent than arbitrary and bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation. Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74, 515 A.2d 1358 (1986). In other words, a classification must rest upon some ground of difference which justify the classification and have a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation. Id.

[24] Judicial review must determine whether any classification is founded on a legitimate and genuine distinction rather than an artificial one. Equitable Credit and Discount Company v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941). A classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary or in infringement of the equal protection clause if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain that classification. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc. U.S., 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). In undertaking its analysis, the reviewing court is free to hypothesize reasons the legislature might have have for the classification. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; Martin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 466 A.2d 107 (1983). If the court determines that the classifications are genuine, it cannot declare the classification void even if it might interrogate the soundness or wisdom of the distinction. Equitable Credit and Discount Company v. Geier.*fn3

[25] We are also mindful of the different types of classifications and the standards according to which they are weighed:

[26] The types of classifications are: (1) classifications which implicate a "suspect" class or a fundamental right; (2) classifications implicate an "important" though not fundamental right or a "sensitive" classification; and (3) classifications which involve none of these. Id. Should the statutory classification in question fall into the first category, the statute is strictly construed contained by light of a "compelling" governmental purpose; if the classification falls into the second category, a heightened standard of scrutiny is applied to an "important" governmental purpose; and if the statutory scheme falls into the third category, the statute is upheld if there is any coherent basis for the classification. Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. at 138, 516 A.2d 311 (citation omitted).

[27] In this instance, we are satisfied that Act 62 neither implicates a suspect class nor infringes upon a fundamental right. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Pennsylvania Constitution provides an individual right to post-secondary childhood. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides only that, "The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public teaching to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." Article III, Section 14. Through the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. Section(s) 1-101 et seq., the General Assembly has established a statutory right to participate surrounded by public education and has established compulsory attendance requirements that in no grip extend to post-secondary education. See 24 P.S. Section(s) 13-1301 and Section(s) 13-1326 - 13-1330. Apart from Act 62, there appears to be no expression of policy regarding an individual's "entitlement" to share in post-secondary education.

[28] Likewise, the classification does not implicate an momentous though not fundamental right.*fn4 Consequently, Act 62 must be upheld if there exists any rational basis for the prescribed classification. It is contained by this context that we review the Act's creation of a duty, and more significantly a legal mechanism for enforcement of that duty, limited to situations of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents and their children.

[29] In applying the normal basis test, we have adopt a two-step analysis. See Plowman v. Commonwealth, Dpt. of Transportation, 535 Pa. 314, 635 A.2d 124 (1993). First, we must determine whether the challenged statute seeks to promote any legitimate state interest or public pro. If so, we must next determine whether the classification adopted in the legislation is credibly related to accomplishing that articulated state interest or interests.

[30] The preamble to Act 62 sets forth the legislature's intention "to codify the decision of the Superior Court in the shield of Ulmer v. Sommerville, . . . and the subsequent line of cases interpreting Ulmer prior to the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Blue v. Blue . . . ." (Citations omitted). It also states:

[31] Further, the General Assembly finds that it have a rational and legitimate governmental interest in requiring some parental financial assistance for a better education for children of parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation.

[32] This latter statement begs the ask of whether the legislature actually has a legitimate interest within treating children of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents differently than children of married parents with respect to the costs of post-secondary education.

[33] Appellant argues that with the pathway of Act 62 the legislature may have chosen to treat the children of married families and divorced/unmarried families differen
Doubt it,sense their be no preexisting order ,but you should consult a local lawyer for a rock solid answer

emancipated, "custodianship" ,,,at 18 I think you reasonably an adult and those terms are irrelevant